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International Human Rights Violations:
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
Paula Alexander Becker

K

iobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. involves an action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The case was
brought in the United States, Southern District of New
York, by the widow of Dr. Barinem Kiobel, a Nigerian
activist and member of the Ogoni tribe, and others for human rights violations committed in the Niger River Delta. Defendants include Royal
Dutch Petroleum, Shell Transport and Trading Co., and Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria. Although the human rights violations
including murder and torture were allegedly committed by the Nigerian
military government, it is claimed that the Royal Dutch Petroleum defendants aided and abetted the Nigerian military in the human rights violations. The plaintiffs had engaged in protests about the environmental damage caused by the Royal Dutch Petroleum defendants in the area of the
Niger Delta and the plight of the Ogoni people in Ogoniland. At the trial
level, the court decided that certain claims involving violations of the Law
of Nations could be heard by the court. However, the case was appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided that there is a presumption
against extraterritoriality in the application of the ATS, and that “mere
presence” of a defendant corporation in the United States is insufficient for
a court to assume jurisdiction. However, the question remains: What corporate presence would serve as a sufficient basis for a court to assume jurisdiction under the ATS? Given the possibility that corporations could, and
perhaps in the future will, be found liable for human rights violations
occurring in foreign locales even after Kiobel, prudent risk management
behooves corporations and their counsel to monitor whether human rights
violations are occurring in connection with their operations, even when those
human rights violations are committed by foreign governments or their
agents.
Keywords: Kiobel; Alien Tort Statute; extraterritoriality; human
rights; risk management
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (133 S. Ct. 1659, decided
April 17, 2013) involves an action under the Alien Tort Statute
(28 U.S.C. 1350; ATS).The case was brought in the United
States, Southern District of New York, by the widow of Dr.
Barinem Kiobel, a Nigerian activist and member of the Ogoni
tribe, and others for human rights violations committed in the
Niger River Delta. Defendants include Royal Dutch Petroleum,
Shell Transport and Trading Co., and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. Although the human rights violations including murder and torture were allegedly committed
by the Nigerian military government, it is claimed that the Royal Dutch Petroleum defendants aided and abetted the Nigerian
military in the human rights violations. The plaintiffs had engaged in protests about the environmental damage caused by
the Royal Dutch Petroleum defendants in the area of the Niger
Delta and the plight of the Ogoni people in Ogoniland.1

The Alien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS, also known as Alien Tort
Claims Act or ATCA) provides: “The district courts shall have
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original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States” (28 U.S.C. 1350).
The courts developed modern jurisdictional rules for the
application of the ATS beginning with the Filartiga case (630
F.2d 876, 2nd 1980). During the regime of Paraguay President
Alfredo Stroessner, Inspector General of Police Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala tortured the brother of plaintiffs Filartiga
to death in Paraguay, allegedly in retaliation for the family’s
opposition to the incumbent regime. Subsequently both Pena
and the plaintiffs Filartiga moved to the United States. When
plaintiff Filartiga learned of Pena’s presence in the United
States, she sued Pena in the Eastern District of New York,
under the ATCA, alleging torture in violation of the Law of
Nations. The Eastern District of New York dismissed the case
on the grounds that the court could not exercise jurisdiction
over Pena-Irala. However the Second Circuit reversed, on the
grounds that torture violates the Law of Nations, and that the
ATS grants jurisdiction to U.S. courts for violations of the Law
of Nations. In the Filartiga case, the U.S. courts exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendant Pena-Irala for acts committed in a foreign territory. The Filartiga court noted: “It is
not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising
outside of its territorial jurisdiction (630 F 2nd at 885).” Later,
in 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (542 US 692), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of the ATS of
1789. The Supreme Court interpreted the ATS as a jurisdictional statute for claims arising from law of nations, and treaties of
United States.

Procedural History of the Kiobel Case

The Kiobel complaint was initially brought in Federal District
court for the Southern District of New York. The trial court
decided that the plaintiffs stated claims could be heard under
the ATS for torture, crimes against humanity, and arbitrary
arrest and detention (456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 2006), and that
claims alleging aiding and abetting for cognizable claims under
the ATS were also viable. Other claims were dismissed by the
trial court because the claims were not recognized as violations
of the Law of Nations. The case was appealed, and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals (621 F.3d 111, 2010) reversed on the
grounds that corporations are not liable under the ATS. Certiorari was granted in by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Kiobel case
was argued during the 2011 term, then reargued during the
2012 term to address the question “[w]hether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute…allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” In April 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
there was a presumption against extraterritorial application of
the ATS, and that “mere presence” of a defendant corporation
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in the United States is insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS.

Open Questions after Kiobel

Post Kiobel, the question now arises whether corporations can
conduct their operations abroad in the expectation that they
will not be liable for human rights violations committed by
foreign governments or whether they must manage their operations so as to avoid the risk of aiding and abetting liability for
human rights violations touching on their operations. Several
issues remain open. This is particularly important in view of
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kiobel, which states:
“The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number
of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation
of the Alien Tort Statute.” Although the judgment of the Court
was unanimous, four Justices, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, filed a concurring opinion, which sets out
a different rationale.
Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather, guided in part
by principles and practices of foreign relations law, I
would find jurisdiction under this statute where (1)
the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United
States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as
well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
Indeed, William Dodge (2013) opines “that the Court’s
language on corporate presence ‘should send chills down the
spines of corporations domiciled in the United States (and their
general counsels).’”

Corporate Presence Justifying
Jurisdiction

The majority in its language, "even where the claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application” leaves open the question of how claims must
“touch and concern the territory of the United States” and with
what force to justify the assumption of jurisdiction by the
courts under the ATS. Ingrid Wuerth (2013) analyzed the majority opinion in Kiobel that because corporations are often
“present” in many countries, their presence alone does not
suffice to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the ATS. Wuerth suggests that “the physical
presence of individual defendants or the incorporation of legal
entities under domestic state law” might provide the presence
sufficient to justify the assumption of jurisdiction under the
ATS even where such jurisdiction concerns actions that occurred outside the territory of the United States.
In addition, Judge Pierre Leval (2013, 16) has suggested
that state courts could provide a forum for the litigation of
claims of human rights violations committed even by foreign
governments.2 Doe v. Unocal is such a case. Doe v. Unocal is a preKiobel case involving a complaint brought under the ATS by
Burmese villagers who complained of human rights violations
including forced labor, murder, torture, and rape against United
Oil Company of California (Unocal), which was conducting
operations in Burma/Myanmar in a joint venture with French
company Total. Unocal, the defendant, is a legal entity incorpo30 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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rated under the laws of California. The case was prosecuted in
the California state courts under the ATS. Doe v. Unocal was
settled once the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to rehear
the case en banc. Based on Unocal’s presence in the United
States, its status as a legal entity of the country and of the state
of California, and given the majority analysis in Kiobel that the
United States not give sanctuary to criminals as well as Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion that defendant’s status as “an
American national ” provides a basis for liability under the
ATS, it is likely that Unocal is the type of case that would survive a Kiobel analysis, overcoming the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. Even if Doe v. Unocal
would not survive a Kiobel analysis leading to the assumption
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the U.S. federal courts, the
courts of California might assume jurisdiction under state law
as suggested above by Judge Pierre Leval.
In its Kiobel decision, the U.S. Supreme Court never
addressed the liability of corporations under the ATS, the rationale on which the Second Circuit overruled the trial court
decision of the Southern District of New York. However, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (558 U.S. 310, 2010)
establishes that corporations and other associations that are not
“natural persons” are nonetheless legal persons under U.S. law
(providing corporations with constitutionally based right of
political free speech).3 It is likely that corporations qua corporations could be liable for human rights violations under the
ATS.
Indeed, foreign sovereigns, including both the UK and the
Netherlands, submitted amicus curiae briefs, arguing that the
assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of the United States
under the ATS was unnecessary because they provided an appropriate forum for the litigation of the claims in Kiobel. Royal
Dutch Petroleum is a corporation of the Netherlands; defendant Shell Transport and Trading Co. is a joint venture, incorporated in the United Kingdom. The UK and the Netherland
argued that the courts where the defendant corporations are
citizens were the appropriate forum for litigating the plaintiffs’
claims.4

Political Risk and ATS exposure

Given the possibility that corporations could, and perhaps in
the future will, be found liable for human rights violations occurring in foreign locales even after Kiobel, prudent risk management behooves corporations and their counsel to monitor
whether human rights violations are occurring in connection
with their operations, even when those human rights violations
are committed by foreign governments or their agents. It
would be imprudent to assume the attitude embodied by Total
and Unocal, expressed by a Total executive to Unocal (395
F.3d 932, 9th Cir. 2002):
By stating that I could not guarantee that the army is
not using forced labour, I certainly imply that they
might, (and they might) but I am saying that we do
not have to monitor army's behavior: we have our
responsibilities; they have their responsibilities; and
we refuse to be pushed into assuming more than
what we can really guarantee. About forced labour
used by the troops assigned to provide security on
our pipeline project, let us admit between Unocal
and Total that we might be in a grey zone.
Risks may be greatest in the energy sector and in less economically developed nations. The mining of energy is a sector
where the demand of economically developing nations including China and India is stimulating global operations by corporations. Much of the mining operations occur in less economi-
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cally developed countries, some of which are governed by military or nondemocratic regimes. Several of the cases arising
under the ATS involved energy companies, including the Kiobel
case, Wiwa case, Unocal case, and Botowo v. Chevron.5 Guidance
is given by the Equator Principles, which were adopted by the
International Finance Corporation World Bank Group and
incorporate social and environmental principles into Project
Finance. The Equator Principles are envisioned for big project

financing involving multiple partners, such as in the Unocal
and Total operations in Burma, the Royal Dutch Petroleum
and Shell Companies in Nigeria, and Texaco oil drilling operations in Ecuador.6 Appropriate risk management by international energy companies requires that they manage the terms of
engagement for their operations so as to minimize human
rights violations and even environmental torts. 7
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Other countries permit some form of lawsuit brought by a foreign national against a foreign national based upon conduct taking
place abroad and seeking damages. Certain countries, which find “universal” criminal “jurisdiction” to try perpetrators of particularly
heinous crimes such as piracy and genocide, see Restatement §404, also permit private persons injured by that conduct to pursue “actions civiles,” seeking civil damages in the criminal proceeding. Thompson, Ramasastry, & Taylor, Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 841, 886 (2009).
See, e. g. , Ely Ould Dah v. France, App. No. 13113/03 (Eur. Ct. H. R.; Mar 30, 2009), 48 Int’l Legal Materials 884; Metcalf, Reparations for Displaced Torture Victims, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 451, 468-470 (2011). Moreover, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, while not authorizing such damages actions themselves, tell us that they would have no objection to the exercise of
American jurisdiction in cases such as Filartiga and Marcos. Netherlands Brief 15-16, and n. 23.
In Bowoto v. Chevron, a jury determined that Chevron was not liable under the ATS for the human rights violations committed by the
Nigerian government. See http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/02/local/me-chevron2. See also 621 F.3d 1116 (9th cir., 2010).
Texaco (Chevron) was prosecuted for environmental torts committed by its operations in Ecuador. The case was initially brought in
the Southern District of New York, but that court did not assume jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens (142 F. Supp. 2d 534
(S.D.N.Y. 200 1), affirmed by 303 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2002). However the SDNY in rejecting jurisdiction over the case granted an
extension of time for plaintiffs, residents of Ecuador, to file a complaint in Ecuador. The case was tried in Ecuador with a judgment
of 8.6 B $US rendered in February 2011, then doubled because Chevron failed to apologize. See “Jungle Law, Vanity Fair, May 2007.
See also http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html and http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2012/01/09/120109fa_fact_keefe?currentPage=all.
See for example, Herz (2000). Litigation of environmental torts under the Alien Tort Statute, would require that environmental pollution violates a treaty of the United States or the law of nations.
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